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$VVHVVLQJWKH5HVSRQVLELOLW\WR3URWHFW¶VPRWLYDWLRQDO
capacity: The role of humanity 
Abstract 
Whilst the concept of humanity is most often referred to as the moral source of the 
5HVSRQVLELOLW\WR3URWHFW¶V53PRWLYDWLRQDOFDSDFLW\KXPDQLW\¶VQRUPDWLYHVWDWXVDQG
value has continued to be left assumed and/or unexplored. Consequently, there remains a 
FRQVLGHUDEOHODFNRIDQDO\VLVLQWRKXPDQLW\¶VUROHLQVXSSRVHGO\KHOSLQJWRERWKORFDWH
moral harm and subsequently providing a motivational cause that can drive protection 
practices in support of the R2P principle. In response to this lacuna, this article puts 
forward three hypotheses regarding the motivational role of humanity in this process; a) 
humanity functioning as a rhetorical tool with no motivational qualities; b) humanity as 
a concept that works to redefine sovereignty in support of the R2P; c) humanity as a 
motivating principle that ultimately diminishes in influence as the R2P principle is 
diffused into action. Through this analysis, the article offers a more rigorous and 
systematic evaluation of humanity's limitations as a moral motivator for generating 
collective response to mass atrocity crimes, highlighting the need to further develop 
understanding of the complex interaction between morality and politics in international 
decision making. 
 
Keywords: humanity, responsibility to protect, sovereignty, humanitarian intervention, 
motivation  
 
Introduction 
In his final report on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as UN Secretary General, Ban 
Ki-moon (2016) placed explicit focus and attention on the continued challenge of 
mobilising collective action for protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes. 
5HIOHFWLQJRQDSHULRGRI³retreating internationalism, diminishing respect of international 
humanitarian law and a growing defeatism about promoting ambitious agendas like 
SURWHFWLRQ´, Ban Ki-moon (2016: 18) PDGHDILQDOSOHDWRPHPEHUVWDWHVWR³VKRZJUHDWHU
resolve in defending and upholding the norms that safeguard humanity, on which the 
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UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR SURWHFW UHVWV´. Critical to his appeal to member states was thus the 
emphasis placed on the centrality of the concept of humanity as an overriding moral 
imperative for motivating action under the R2P. Whilst the principle of the R2P is first of 
all framed around the idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own 
populations from four mass atrocity crimes (Genocide, Crimes against humanity, War 
crimes and Ethnic cleansing), the failure of a state to meet this responsibility is  argued 
to generate a further responsibility for the international community to respond, in order 
to provide protection. In this regard, it is the concept of humanity which has been argued 
to underpin this specific moral obligation for the international community to respond to 
mass atrocity crimes. However, as previous literature has highlighted (Zolo, 2002; 
Zehfuss, 2012), appeals to the moral cause of humanity have been a consistent part of 
attempts to motivate humanitarian responses to mass atrocity crime situations, long 
before the introduction of the R2P, and with vastly contradictory results. Thus, as the 
current global context exemplifies, questions remain as to the extent to which the concept 
of humanity can in fact function as an effective motivator of political will under the 
specific framework of the R2P. In response, there is therefore a need to more empirically 
examine what role is played by the concept of humanity during the process of generating 
consensus for humanitarian DFWLRQDQGIXUWKHUPRUHWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRIWKH53¶VIRFXVRQ
the motivational power of moral concepts. 
Despite the considerable emphasis placed on the concept of humanity, it has most 
often been WKHFDVHWKDWKXPDQLW\¶VQRUPDWLYHVWDWXVDQGYDOXe has been one left assumed 
and/or unexplored by both scholars of the R2P and international relations theorists more 
broadly. $V*DOODJKHUKDVDUJXHG³scholars specifically appeal to humanity 
3 
 
in order to facilitate their argument, but more often than not, fail to ground it in a 
substantive manner´ Furthermore, whilst the concept of humanity has been studied 
extensively over the last few decades (Nussbaum, 1997; Gaita 2000; Teitel 2011;), there 
has been a significant lack of research into the relationship between the R2P and 
humanity, in particular the extent to which moral claims to the motivational capacity of 
humanity can help to generate political will. As a consequence of such oversights, those 
attempting to explain the process through which the R2P is able to motivate state response 
to mass atrocity crimes have continued to fall back on the concept of humanity as the 
underlying moral imperative, without sufficient empirical analysis of its motivational 
capacity and impact.  
For R2P advocates such as Thakur (2015: 23), the concept of humanity is seen to 
function DV WKH VRXUFH RI WKH 53¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ ZKLFK KH EHOLHYHV
³GHPDQGVDQDFFHSWDQFHRIDGXW\RIFDUHE\DOORIXVZKROLYHLQ]RQHVRIVDIHW\WRZDUGV
DOOWKRVHZKRDUHWUDSSHGLQ]RQHVRIGDQJHU´6XEVHTXHQWO\WKH53is conceptualised 
as ³WKHQRUPDWLYHLQVWUXPHQWRIFKRLFHIRUFRQYHUWLQJDVKRFNHGLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQVFLHQFH
into decisive collective action ± for channelling individual moral indignation into 
collective policy remedies ± WRSUHYHQWDQGVWRSDWURFLWLHV´ (Thakur, 2015: 23). In this 
sense, the R2P is understood to function as a tool of conversion, helping the UN to better 
harness the collective will of member states in order to transfer moral outrage into timely 
and decisive action, whenever mass atrocity crimes are committed. Underpinning the R2P 
project therefore, is the idea that ³E\ EXLOGLQJ DQG LQYRNLQJ D VHQVH RI FRPPRQ
responsibility ± shared by states and other international actors ± more concerted efforts 
to prevent and respond to atrocity crimes ZRXOGEHXQGHUWDNHQ´ (Welsh, 2016: 985).  
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However, this focus on the existence of a clear moral lineage from the conscious 
shocking nature of crimes, to the implementation of action to avert global and universal 
threats, arguably overestimates the motivational role of humanity in influencing state 
decision making in complex R2P cases. As a result, there is a considerable lack of 
engagement with the role of humanity as a normative concept that can supposedly help 
to both locate moral harm and subsequently provide a motivational cause that can also 
drive protection and prevention practices. In response to this lacuna, it is argued that the 
relative simplicity of the moral debates surrounding the idea of an ³R2P conversion 
process´1 have ultimately led to an exaggerated presumption regarding the motivational 
qualities held by the concept of humanity. This is significant, as it brings into question 
the coherence of claims made LQ VXSSRUW RI WKH53¶V VWDWXV DV D GLVWLQFW PRUDO GXW\
(Orford, 2013; Erskine, 2016), therefore generating the need to re-evaluate the connection 
between political will and the existence of shared moral duties to a common humanity. 
In this sense, the article challenges the uncritical assumptions made regarding the 
motivational capacity of humanity, in order to raise significant questions in relation to the 
processes through which debates about motivating state actors, confronted by mass 
atrocities, take place. The key aim of this article is thus to provide a more empirical 
examination of why humanity does not result in the effective motivation of states in 
response to mass atrocity crime situations. In doing so the article focuses specifically on 
reconciling GLYHUJHQW XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI KXPDQLW\¶V UROH LQ WKLV SURFHVV, in order to 
explain why the concept continues to be invoked in the framing of harm, yet at the same 
time remains a relatively diminished aspect in motivating specific responses to mass 
atrocity crimes. In response, it is argued that what remains vital to developing a more 
5 
 
comprehensive understanding of KXPDQLW\¶V role in this process is a greater focus on the 
complex interaction between morality and politics. Through further emphasising this 
interaction it will be possible to better explain the current ³R2P mobilisation gap´2, 
highlighted by Ban Ki-moon, and the specific tensions that are implicit in the process of 
generating collective responses to the threat of mass atrocity crimes. 
The argument is structured as follows. Firstly, the article explores the role of 
humanity as the central moral imperative behind the ambition of the R2P project, 
examining the philosophical arguments that underpin the link between humanity as a 
concept used to locate universal human harms and its role as a moral imperative that 
works to motivate the prevention of such harms. In doing so it directly challenges the 
assumed existence of a default responsibility to protect and prevent atrocity crimes and 
argues for a closer examination of the role humanity plays as a motivational component 
of the R2P. The second part of the article is then structured around three contrasting 
interpretations of how humanity functions during the process of motivating collective 
action on behalf of the R2P. Humanity is hypothesised as either: a) functioning as a 
rhetorical tool with no motivational qualities; b) as a concept that works to redefine and 
humanise sovereignty in order to motivate support for the R2P; or c) as a motivating 
principle that is ultimately diminished in influence as the R2P principle is diffused into 
action. The article will subsequently argue that the strength of humanity is seen to exist 
in its ability to locate moral harm rather than its ability to motivate action in the name of 
humanity itself. In this sense, the concept of humanity can be best understood as a 
motivational factor that is seen to diminish throughout the process of generating 
consensus for R2P responses, highlighting how the cause of humanity has failed to be 
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directly internalised into state interests and identities, when it comes to the question of 
how to respond to mass atrocity crimes. The diminished influence of humanity during 
such discussions can therefore be understood through examining how states often appeal 
to competing moral and political responsibilities when attempting to address the broader 
question of how to respond. What this suggests is that the concept of humanity does not 
therefore easily translate from framing harm, to framing a response to harm. To conclude, 
the article argues that in order to move forward discussions regarding the limits of the 
R2P as a mobilising principle for action there must be space for a more critical approach 
to conceptualising the constraining realities of international decision making and a 
recognition of humanity as an increasingly contested source of moral responsibility.  
Before beginning it is important to briefly clarify the scope and parameters of this article. 
In this regard, the article remains focused on assessing the interaction between state actors 
at the UN level and their invocation of humanity as a justificatory and rhetorical tool. 
Whilst there is much that can be examined in regard to the relationship between states, 
1*2¶VDQGWKHPHGLD in terms of motivating mass atrocity responses, such analysis falls 
beyond the possible scope of this article. Furthermore, the article does not seek to provide 
or engage in detail with definitional debates regarding what humanity is seen to signify 
and to whom. In contrast, the article is instead focused on assessing the challenge of 
attempting to locate KXPDQLW\¶Vvalue and thus reinforces the difficulties of appealing to 
humanity as a distinct motivator for action.  
Protecting the imperative of humanity  
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Before moving on to discuss the motivational role of humanity in relation to the R2P, it 
is crucial to first of all discuss humanity more broadly, in order to outline why appeals to 
a common humanity have historically been used to impel states to respond to a variety of 
humanitarian crises. From a cosmopolitan standpoint it is first of all argued that the 
DFNQRZOHGJPHQWRIDFRPPRQKXPDQLW\WUDQVODWHV³ethically into an idea of shared or 
common moral duties toward otheUVE\YLUWXHRIWKLVKXPDQLW\´(Lu, 2000: 245). In this 
sense, the idea of each person having an equal moral status is thus seen to ground appeals 
to humanity and the justification for its protection. It is from this position that one can 
subsequently defend the ideal that every human being belongs to a single community of 
humankind and that everyone therefore also shares a set of natural capacitates (Bartleson, 
2009: 171). Central to this shared set of natural capacities is thus the recognition that we 
as human beings all share natural vulnerabilities (Lu, 2006: 193). Consequently, it is the 
framing of this cosmopolitan argument that remains integral to grounding the crucial link 
made between the moral obligation for states to address and respond to mass atrocity 
crimes through the R2P principle and the role of humanity as the imperative that 
supposedly underpins this responsibility. 
The codification of the R2P principle into the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document 
(WSOD) has often be viewed as a key milestone in the on-going process of ³ZLGHQLQJ
the scope of emotional identification between different people as well as the development 
of moral concerns for the future oI KXPDQLW\´ /LQNODWHU  457). The moral 
obligations outlined by the R2P are thus considered to broaden the scope of responsibility 
for all international actors, through recognising the global need to protect populations 
from four major crimes. As Bellamy (2015: 72) argues, at its core the R2P should 
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therefore be understood as relating to two sets of internal claims; one around the 
responsibilities of states to protect their own populations, and another regarding the roles 
and responsibilities of the international community to assist and respond. The R2P can 
then be further separated into three pillars, with Pillar I focused on state responsibilities 
and Pillar II and III relating to the responsibilities of the international community 
specifically. Consequently, it is the concept of humanity that has therefore been argued 
to underpin the essential moral obligation of the international community to provide 
sufficient protection and assistance to those threatened by mass atrocity crimes (Welsh, 
2014: 127). 
In unpacking this relationship one must start by recognising that central to the 
motivation for creating the R2P, is a sense that in spite of all the other major failures in 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV ³WKH ZRUOG FRXOG QR ORQJHU DIIRUG WR PLVKDQGOH LWV FROOHFWLYH
responsibility to genocide and other mass atrocity crimes´(YDQV015: 16). The R2P is 
therefore framed as more than an initiative simply focused on the need to better recognise 
WKH³LQWLPDWHFRQQHFWLRQVEHWZHHQV\VWHPDWLFDQGZLGHVSUHDGYLRODWLRQVRIWKHULJKWVRI
civilians and the breakdown in international RUGHU´(Annan, 1999). It is ultimately a moral 
imperative built upon the premise that there is something fundamentally significant about 
mass atrocities crimes which creates the need for us to appeal to a higher moral obligation 
whilst acknowledging that atrocity crimes cannot be simply contained and managed.  
As Welsh (2012: 105) has argued ³WKHVRXUFHRI53¶VPRUDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\FDQ
be found in the commissioneUV DSSHDOV WR ³FRPPRQ KXPDQLW\´ whereby to commit 
genocide or engage in ethnic cleansing is to fail to treat people as humans, thereby 
WKUHDWHQLQJDOORIKXPDQLW\¶VYDOXHVDQGLQWHUHVWV7KLV LVZKDWarguably generates the 
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moral responsibility for members of the international community to act and find a remedy.  
Humanity is thus used to ground the concept of a wider international community, one that 
LVDEOHWRUHFRJQLVHWKHLGHD³WKDWFRPPXQLW\LVHTXDOO\UHOHYDQWLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\DVLWLV
domestically´%XOOH\7). In this regard, the continuation of the outbreak of mass 
atrocities crimes is presented as a reality that is fundamentally damaging to a collective 
value of humanity (Ki-moon 2015). The act of intervention, can therefore be understood 
DVDQDWWHPSWE\WKHLQWHUYHQHUVWR³VHFXUHWKHERXQGDULHVRIKXPDQLW\DQGWRDIILUPLWV
dominant place in tKHXQLYHUVH´0LWFKHOO2).  
Subsequently, it is not simply individual lives that are threatened by atrocity 
crimes but a collective universal value that is attached to the concept of humanity (Arendt 
(1963). As Luban (2004: 90) has explored in relation to the philosophical underpinnings 
of crimes against humanity, the idea of a harm against humanity can be understood both 
as an assault on our character as political animals, as well as a threat to group affiliation 
through attacking individuals on the basis of their group membership, thus directly 
threatening the collective diversity of humankind (Luban, 2004: 117). There is therefore 
a case to suggest that mass atrocity crimes challenge something much deeper and more 
valuable than traditional security threats, whereby our response to averting them must 
reflect this axiom. Thus, for Simon (2016:  ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPHV GR PRUH WKDQ
WUDQVFHQGQDWLRQDOERXQGDULHV´DQGJREH\RQGWKHFDWHJRULVDWLRQRI³FULPHVDJDLQVWWKH
peace and security of mankind - LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULPHV XQGHUPLQH JOREDO PRUDOLW\´ As 
Mitchell (2014: 5) subsequently argues, this belief in the threat of mass atrocity crimes to 
DVKDUHGJOREDOPRUDOLW\FDQEHVHHQWRVWHPIURPDQDVVXPSWLRQWKDW³KXPDQOLIHLVWKH
KLJKHVW IRUP RI EHLQJ´ ZKHUHE\ LW LV KXPDQ EHLQJV DORQH ZKR DUH UHVSRQVLEOH IRU
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KXPDQLW\¶VVXUYLYDO,QWKLVVHQVHWKHFULPHVRI53DUHVHHQWRWKUHDWHQ³WKHV\VWHPDWLF
destruction of a human society, and thus its ability to live aQGIORXULVK´0LWFKHOO 2014: 
53). Consequently, it is important to highlight that the language of humanity is not simply 
XVHG DV ³diSORPDWLF RU DFDGHPLF IORXULVKHV´ but can in fact be seen to influence the 
theoretical construction of international crimes and the policies created to avert them 
(Weinert, 2015: 25). Hence, it is the concept of humanity that remains central to the 
foundation of arguments in support of states having a moral responsibility to act in certain 
humanitarian cases.  
However, what the R2P and those who promote and study its influence have so 
often failed to examine is the extent to which these claims to the importance of protecting 
the moral category of humanity can provide not just a way to reflect on the harm caused 
by atrocity crimes (Macleod, 2012), but a sufficient motivation in order for states to seek 
to convert moral outrage into appropriate action. As Tan (2006: 88) highlights, the R2P 
seems to take for granted the existence of a default responsibility to protect, with the only 
obstacle to this responsibility being the principle of non-intervention. One must instead 
recognise that the permissibility of intervention alone does not therefore generate an 
obligation (Tan, 2006: 88). In taking for granted this default responsibility, advocates 
appear to have overlooked the complexity of the moral debates that are integral to 
conceptualising the R2P conversion process. Thus, if we are to fully understand the 
barriers that remain to building consensus on converting international moral indignation 
into effective response to atrocity crimes, we must focus on better explaining  KXPDQLW\¶V
empirical role in this process and the extent to which the R2P interacts with, and is 
constrained by, KXPDQLW\¶V overall motivational capacity. 
11 
 
Debating the motivational aspects of humanity 
There are three broad ways in which one can hypothesise the motivational aspect/capacity 
of humanity and its relation to the R2P: a) as a rhetorical tool with no motivational 
qualities; b) as a concept that works to redefine and humanise sovereignty in order to 
motivate support for the R2P, or; c) a concept that is important to framing the impact of 
mass atrocity crimes, EXWZKR¶VUROHLVGLPLQLVKHGas the R2P principle is diffused into 
action. Through engaging with these contrasting hypotheses RIKXPDQLW\¶VPRWLYDWLRQDO
role, it will ultimately be argued that whilst humanity remains an integral moral concept 
for framing the harm of mass atrocity crimes, its motivational capacity can be best 
conceptualised as a diminished force, whereby its ability to provide the source of a clear 
moral obligation is undermined as it moves along the process of generating consensus for 
action.  
Humanity as rhetorical 
There have long been claims against the moral consistency of appeals to humanity, from 
6FKPLGW¶VIDPRXVFULWLTXHWKDW³ZKRHYHULQYRNHVKXPDQLW\ZDQWVWRFKHDW´
to more contemporary challenges that suggest appeals to humanity are used in ways that 
³REVFXUHV WKDW OLYHV DUH YDOXHGGLIIHUHQWO\´ %XWOHU 50). Consequently, this has 
often reinforced a base assumption by intervention sceptics that references to common 
humanity by member states and diplomats function as nothing more than rhetorical 
flourishes, whereby the concept is seen to not only lack any sort of real motivational 
power, but also does not reflect the way individual actors interpret and internalise the 
impact of mass atrocity crimes on the international system as a whole. This apparent 
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disconnect between rhetoric and reality has thus become a common theme of R2P 
analysis, as scholars attempt to explain the often conflicting universal support for the R2P 
through language and rhetoric, and the widely inconsistent application of its stated aims 
by member states (Hehir, 2012; Welsh, 2015).  
One potential explanation for this reality is to simply conclude that the concept of 
humanity does not generate strong motivational drivers for R2P type responses. As 
Gallagher (2016: H[SODLQV³VWDWHVDUHPDGHXSRIKXPDQEHLQJVDQGSROLWLFDOHOLWHV
may even invoke concepts such as humanity when constructing international agreements 
but this does not mean that common humanity existV´,QWKLVVHQVHE\UHMHFWLQJWKHLGHD
of any deeper human connection generating solidarity between humankind, one is left to 
question the fundamental premise of the R2P conversion process, and the very idea that 
shared moral outrage can drive collective action in order to protect. In response, a 
rejection of humanity ultimately places greater emphasis on the need to isolate the R2P 
outside of moral and normative debates, in order to fully assess the current contradictions 
that exist between state rhetoric and action, and focus on the underlying political factors 
driving state policy. This realist focused approach to understanding the relationship 
between humanity and the R2P will now be examined in more detail before being partially 
refuted. 
The starting point for this realist DSSURDFKLVWKHDFNQRZOHGJPHQWRIWKH³SRZHU
politics at play beneath tKHVORJDQV´*DOODJKHU351) and the recognition WKDW³WKH
idealistic tone in some normative advocacy of R2P is mainly political: a discourse to 
shape political decision-PDNLQJ´+DUULVRQ,QWKLVVHQVHWKHDELOLW\RIWKH53WR
successfully build agreement for action in mass atrocity crime situations is one that must 
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be understood exclusively in the realm of the political; by which the normative concept 
of humanity functions solely to legitimate political motivation, rather than grounding a 
moral goal to be put into practice. Motivation for carrying out action is thus 
fundamentally understood through WKHLQWHUHVWVRISRZHUIXOVWDWHV³ZKRDUHWKHPVHOYHV
QRWVXEMHFWWRWKHµXQLYHUVDO¶HWKLFRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\´0RVHV133). Consequently, 
a belief in the underlying dominance of power politics in relation to the R2P has continued 
to be a point of controversy, with questions over the extent to which it has allowed states 
to dress up the language of protection and humanity in order to implement strategies in 
support of their own interests (Hurd, 2012).  
Furthermore, as Hobson (2016: 438) has highlighted, the revival of classical 
realist thinkers; Morgenthau, Hobbes, and Schmitt, have influenced new approaches to 
WKH 53 WKDW ILUPO\ UHMHFW WKH FRQFHSW¶V DELOLW\ WR VXSSRVHGO\ ³WUDQVFHQG SROLWLFV´
Political realists such as Sleat (2016a) have thus called for a greater focus on the way 
³SUDFWLFHVRISROLWLFVZRUN´LQUHODWLRQWRWKH53LQRUGHUWRDFNQRZOHGJHWKDW³DOPRVW
DQ\SROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQZLOOJHQHUDWHXQLQWHQGHGFRQVHTXHQFHV´DQGWKXV³DFWLQJZLWKWKH
best intentions of preventing evil in mind is no guarantee that we will not end up doing 
PRUHKDUPWKDQJRRG´,QUHVSRQVHWRWKLVSROitical reality, Sleat (2016b: 78) has argued 
WKDW WKH53VKRXOGQRWEHXQGHUVWRRGDVDQDWWHPSW³WRSXWDXQLYHUVDOO\ MXVWLILHGRU
justifiable moral programme into effect, but as the attempt to create very localised centres 
RIOHJLWLPDWHVWDELOLW\DQGRUGHULQFRPSOH[FRQGLWLRQVRIFKDRVYLROHQFHDQGGLVRUGHU´ 
However, in reducing the R2P to a purely political transaction involving the 
transformation of violent chaos into order and stability, this approach arguably overlooks 
the way in which the concept of humanity is central to grounding the four major crimes 
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of the R2P and our understanding of why certain acts are universally understood to 
constitute the most shocking of international crimes. In other words, without an 
acknowledgment of the moral concept of humanity it is not possible to fully conceptualise 
the full harm of mass atrocity crimes, particularly in regard to those who are forced to 
experience and live with the consequences of such acts. Thus as Papamichail and Partis-
Jennings (2016: 87) have argued, there is a need to recognise that mass atrocity crimes 
KDYH ³D V\PEROLF GLPHQVLRQ DV ZHOO DV D SUDFWLFDO RQH´ WKHUHIRUH D QRUPDWLYH
understanding of humanity is key to any aspiration WR³WUDQVFHQGWKHUDGLFDOO\GLYLVLYH
and dehumanising aspiUDWLRQVRIJHQRFLGDODFWLRQ´. This ultimately requires recognition 
of the need to separate out the meanings we place on the concept of humanity; as not 
simply an appeal to the imposition of universal actions of protection at the expense of the 
underlying political dynamics, but functioning as an essential moral force for collective 
harm recognition during discussions of implementation. 
,QWKLVUHJDUGKXPDQLW\¶VUHODWLRQWRWKHSROLWLFVRILQWHUYHQWLon practices is one 
that will often be defined by a diversity of legitimate but potentially conflicting ethical 
considerations (Lu, 2007: 945); but that does not equate to the idea that humanity should 
simply be thought of as devoid of value or merit. State decision makers will often be 
forced to choose between competing moral duties to a range of international norms, which 
FDQUHVXOWLQ³FRXQWHUYDLOLQJPRUDOFODLPV´RYHUULGLQJDSSHals to protection (Vik, 2015: 
22). However, whether or not we have a shared ideal of unconditional common humanity 
or agree on the actions performed in its name, the fact that we continue to ask the question 
RIµVKRXOGZHDFW¶LQWKHthreat of mass atrocity crimes in the first place, assumes that we 
do have some moral ideals and principles, by which we choose to recognise and condemn 
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certain acts as inhuman (Luban, 2002: 99). In this sense, the recognition of a shared moral 
concept remains integral as without which the question of should we act in the face of 
mass atrocity crimes simply would not arise. Thus, ³PDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIVHOI-interest and 
inconsistency do not necessarily detract from underlying common moral sentiment 
precisely because they are exposed as self-LQWHUHVWHGDQGLQFRQVLVWHQW´3DSDPLFKDil and 
Partis-Jennings, 2016: 94). It can therefore be argued that attempts to reduce the concept 
of humanity to a rhetorical cover for political self-interest significantly underplays the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIKXPDQLW\¶VUROHLQUHLQIRUFLQJWKHDVVXPHGPRUDOZURQJIRXQGZLWKLQWKH
actions of the perpetrators of atrocities, and in generating a harm that can be seen to 
transcend traditional sovereign borders. However, the extent to which the concept can 
provide more than a reflective point of reference for locating universal harm remains 
much more fundamentally contested.  
Humanising sovereignty 
The creation of the R2P is often argued to have redefined state understanding of 
sovereignty, through connecting it to an idea of compliance to specific universal duties, 
thus demanding that states extend their responsibilities to others in order to create a more 
³LQFOXVLYH FRPPXQLW\ RI KXPDQNLQG´ /LQNODWHU  392). As a consequence, the 
construction of the R2P is framed as a direct solution to the previous barriers in forging 
consensus for protection practices, through acknowledging that responsibility can transfer 
IURPWKHVWDWHWRWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOEDVHGRQ³WKHVHYHULW\RIWKHDWURFLW\´:HOVK
2012: 106)7KLVHQDEOHVVWDWHVWRQRZ³FODLPDKLJKHUDXWKRULW\WKDQWKHPHUHO\VHOILVK
claiPWRDµULJKWRILQWHUYHQWLRQ¶DQGWKXVUHLQIRUFHVWKHLGHDRIKXPDQLWDULDQSURWHFWLRQ
as a higher normative goal of the internationDOFRPPXQLW\´&XQOLIIH81). In this 
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senseWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\PXVWQRZEH³DQVZHUDEOHWRDKLJKHUDXWKRULWy, that 
RIPRUDOLW\´LQRUGHUWRUHMHFWWKHDEVROXWLVPRIWUDGLWLRQDO VRYHUHLJQW\´+RSJRRG
190). According to Mitchell (2014: 40), in order to challenge sovereignty there is a need 
WR³WDS LQWRDSURIRXQG VRXUFHRI FROOHFWLYHEHOLHIDERXW WKHFDSDbilities and duties of 
KXPDQV´:KDWWKLVVXJJHVWVLVWKDWKXPDQLW\LVDFRQFHSWWKDWLVLQQHHGRISURWHFWLRQ
whereby the threats made against it create a state of exception that require human agents 
to challenge such violence. In this regard, it is argued that the concept of humanity must 
be central to driving the desire to address the real or potential threat of mass atrocity 
crimes, through which it will then be possible to overcome the central tension that exists 
EHWZHHQ ³VRYHUHLJQW\ DQG WKH SURWHFWLon of KXPDQ OLYHV´ 0LWFKHOO  43). This 
theoretical position has therefore led R2P advocates such as Peters (2009a) to argue that: 
³&RQIOLFWVEHWZHHQVWDWHVRYHUHLJQW\DQGKXPDQULJKWVVKRXOGQRWEHDSSURDFKHG
in a balancing process in which the former is played off against the latter on an 
equal footing, but should be tackled on the basis of a presumption in favour of 
KXPDQLW\´513).  
³,W LV P\ FODLP WKDW VRYHUHLJQW\ KDV DOUHDG\ EHHQ UHOHJDWHG WR WKH VWDWXV RI D
second-order norm which is derived from and geared towards the protection of 
basic human rights, neeGVLQWHUHVWVDQGVHFXULW\´ 
In reference to the R2P, Peters (2009b: 155) highlights this re-characterisation of 
sovereignty as implying a now inherent responsibility to protect and thus further 
emphasises the role of humanity as the ultimate normative source of international law. 
What this argument suggests is that humanity has fundamentally re-defined the normative 
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construction of state obligations under international law, making sovereignty now work 
in favour of protection. Peters (2009a: 513) has thus referred to this process as the 
³KXPDQL]DWLRQRIVRYHUHLJQW\´DUJXLQJ that sovereignty VKRXOGQRZEHVHHQ WR³H[LVW
RQO\LQIXQFWLRQRIKXPDQLW\´. 
However, the 2005 WSOD, enshrining the scope of the R2P, was specifically 
FRQVWUXFWHGWR³IRUWLI\H[LVWLQJOHJDOFRPPLWPHQWVDVRSSRVHGWRDQDWWHPSWWRWUDQVIRUP
international ODZ RU FUHDWH QHZ OHJDO REOLJDWLRQV´ 7DFKHYD 	 %URZQ 2016: 442). 
Consequently, it is vital to acknowledge that the R2P also directly aims to strengthen 
traditional state sovereignty through working to create a better balance between 
competing moral claims and motivations for states to protect and prevent mass atrocity 
crimes. As has previously been noted by Bellamy (2015: 72), the complex nature of the 
53¶V QRUPDWLYH FRQVWUXFWLRQ PHDQV WKDW DQDO\VLV RI LWV LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ UHTXLUHV D
recognition of the multiple responsibilities it attempts to enforce, concerning both the 
responsibility of states to their own populations and the responsibilities of the 
international community to assist and respond.  
The introduction of the R2P thus sought to provide a bridge between the dividing 
principles of humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty, in order to reject the idea 
that both principles are forced to be in constant confrontation or that one simply trumps 
the other (Glanville, 2013: 191). In this sense, the R2P can be categorised as an attempt 
to provide a more flexible negotiation between the demands of sovereignty and the 
protection of humanity, both of which have moral and legal justifications. As Ban Ki-
moon (2008) has argued, the R2P must be understood as an ³DQDOO\RIVRYHUHLJQW\QRW
DQDGYHUVDU\´DQGWKXVseeks WR³VWUHQJWKHQVRYHUHLJQW\QRWZHDNHQLW´ This point has 
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been further emphasised through the increased link between the R2P and state capacity 
building, which is used to reinforce the sovereign power of the state and its ability to 
provide protection to its citizens (Roach, 2016: 408). Humanity in this sense is not always 
the central normative component in the motivational process of implementing R2P 
responses, even if it may be essential as a reflective guide to locating universal moral 
harms in the first place. Thus, rather than the R2P being part of a distinct process of 
humanising sovereignty it is in fact working to both reinforce sovereignty in certain cases 
and challenge traditional interpretations of sovereignty in others.  
Consequently, whilst the R2P seeks to find a balance between both supporting 
DQGUHIUDPLQJVWDWHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVRYHUHLJQW\DWLWVFRUHWKH53DOVRUHIHUVWR³JOREDO
UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVWKDWFDQRQO\EHPHWE\VDFULILFLQJQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV´5DOSK7KLV
idea of sacrifice can therefore be seen to stem from the moral arguments enforced by the 
FRQFHSWRIKXPDQLW\VXJJHVWLQJWKHQHHGWR³SURWHFWDYLVLRQRIFRPPRQKXPDQLW\DQG
DQDVVRFLDWHGEDVHOLQHRIVROLGDULW\LQUHVSRQVHWRFUXHOW\DQGKXPDQVXIIHULQJ´5DGLFH
2016: 103). As a result, the motivational capacity of humanity remains significantly 
intertwined with the internalisDWLRQRIKXPDQLWDULDQFRQFHUQVZLWKLQVWDWHV³LQWHUHVWVDQG
LGHQWLWLHV´ DQG WKH DELOLW\ RI WKH 53 QRUP WR UHLQIRUFH WKHVH EHOLHIV LQ RUGHU WR
³HQFRPSDVVDFRQFHUQIRUWKHYLFtims RIFULPHVDJDLQVWKXPDQLW\´ (Brown, 2013: 442). 
In this sense, whilst the R2P is constructed at one level to help strengthen state 
sovereignty, its ability to fundamentally change state identity and decision making 
towards a universal responsibility to protect is supported by the motivational force of 
humanity. 
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However, as Marlier and Crawford (2013: 398) highlight, whilst the R2P has 
clearly attempted to expand the United Nations Security Council's ³FLUFOHRIHPSDWK\´
through broadening its focus towards the protection of individuals and beyond the state, 
it also remains the case that this belief has not been deeply institutionalised, especially on 
WKHQDWLRQDOOHYHODQGWKXV³PDQ\RIXVVWLOOGRQ
WVHHDPRUDOUHODWLRQVKLSWRDGLVWDQW
RWKHU´ 0DUOLHU DQG Crawford, 2013: 413). Yet, for the R2P to fundamentally address 
occasions when host states remain indifferent or complicit in mass atrocity crimes, it is 
essential that states can be motivated to bypass their immediate state interests and claims 
of traditional sovereign autonomy. This dilemma has thus played out to devastating effect 
LQWKHFDVHRI6\ULD³DVQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWFRQWLQXHVWRWUXPSKXPDQLWDULDQQHHG´OHDGLQJ
many to question the limits of moral advocacy for generating change in state behaviour 
(Hehir, 2016: 166). What this ultimately suggests is that humanity has not so far been 
deeply internalised into state understanding of responsibility. 
As this section has outlined, the relationship between humanity and sovereignty 
in supporting the R2P concept remains distinctly fluid, whereby the R2P has not simply 
redefined sovereignty through greater appeal to specific obligations generated by the 
concept of humanity. In this sense, rather than see the R2P as igniting a debate that plays 
off claims in VXSSRUWRIKXPDQLW\¶VSURWHFWLRQ against those of state sovereignty, it is 
much more the case that the complex layers of responsibility that are contained in the 
R2P principle reinforce distinctly separate normative claims in different situations. 
Furthermore, as Labonte (2016: 142) argues, it has never really been the case that 
³VRYHUHLJQW\DQGnon-interference´SRVHWKH³SUHGRPLQDQWREVWDFOHWRVDYLQJVWUDQJHUV- 
SROLWLFDOZLOOKDV´7KXVLW remains critical to highlight that whilst a strong commitment 
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to principles of human protection are in theory not incompatible with territorial 
sovereignty (Linklater, 2016: 422), the ability to motivate states in response to atrocity 
crimes beyond their borders still requires a clear acceptance of moral sacrifice that has 
continued to be hard to generate. In this sense, the R2P has so far struggled to fully 
internalise the principle of humanity as a consistent motivational component reshaping 
state decision making at the international level.  
The diminished impact of humanity 
One of the most important ways in which the motivational force of humanity is seen to 
function, is in regard to its role in helping to secure a so-FDOOHG³PRUDOELWH´7KHLGHDRI
³D PRUDO ELWLQJ SRLQW´ ZDV VRPHWKLQJ WKDW ZDV UHIHUUHG WR LQ WKH 2001 International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, in which it was argued 
WKDW³JHWWLQJDPRUDOPRWLYH WRELWHPHDQVKRZHYHUEHLQJDEOH WRFRQYH\D VHQVHRI
urgency and reality about the threat to human life in a particulDUVLWXDWLRQ´,&,66
In other words, what the conceptualisation of a moral biting point assumes is that there is 
a direct and consistent relationship between shock and the motivation to respond, in which 
a certain threshold can be reached in order for the R2P to overcome competing state 
obligations and reinforce such a responsibility. However, as Bain (2010: 45) has argued, 
WKH SUREOHP ³LV QRW IRXQG LQ WKH FKDOOHQJH RI FRQQHFWLQJ WKH XUJHQF\ DQG UHDOLW\ RI
particular situations with an appropriate (moUDOPRWLYH´EXW LQ³DQRYHU-emphasis on 
µUHVSRQVLELOLW\¶ZKLFKIRUDOOLWVDWWUDFWLYHQHVVFDQQRWEHDUWKHZHLJKWSODFHGRQLW´ 
Subsequently, when one examines the later stages of the process through which 
states go about generating the required consensus to take action, it is most often a complex 
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web of empirical and structural concerns rather than a singular overriding moral threshold 
that begins to dictate such decision making (Hehir, 2016). As the UN (2014) deadlock in 
addressing the Syria crisis exemplifies, despite a number of initial statements that called 
IRUDQHHGWR³SXW action for humanity above inaction for interests´appeals towards the 
higher moral goal of protecting humanity were increasingly muted, as the complexities 
of dealing with the specific geopolitical realities on the ground became more apparent 
(Ralph and Gifkins, 2016). What this example suggests is not simply that the concept of 
humanity plays no role in framing the motivation for such discussions, but instead that its 
influence on proceedings is limited by a range of competing constraints on state interests 
and behaviour. As a result, the moral bite of humanity is one that arguably does not hold 
for particularly long and as such is loosened by many other factors. In this sense, it is not 
only the case that superior political pressures and contingences limit the role of humanity 
as a motivational force but also that the ill-defined nature of humanity itself means that 
the concept is severely limited as a motivator for specific R2P responses. 
Consequently, despite the reformulation of language and the normative focus 
brought about through the introduction of the R2P, the barriers that still exist to 
motivating consensus for action remain constrained by the same limits that have so often 
thwarted humanitarian causes in the past. In this sense, the underlying political dynamics 
that condition when and where states may choose to respond to atrocity crimes mean that 
KXPDQLWDULDQQRUPVDUH³VWLOOJHQHUDOO\KRQRXUHGPRUHLQWKHLUEUHDFK´/DERQWH: 
157). Furthermore, as Linklater (2016: DUJXHV³HPRWLRQDOUHVSRQVHVWRLQDFWLYLW\LQ
WKH IDFH RI GLVWDQW VXIIHULQJ UHPDLQ ZHDN´ ZKHUHE\ WKH OLQN PDGH EHWZHHQ PRUDO
indignation and practical implementation continues to be fundamentally contested in 
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relation to what specific responsibilities humanity generates. As a result of this oversight, 
the demands we place on the concept of humanity as an overriding motivational force can 
at times lead us to simplify the complexity of moral decision making. This is perhaps best 
HQFDSVXODWHGE\%DUQHWW¶V FRPPHQWVUHIOHFWLQJRQWKH81¶VIDLOXUHWRDYHUWWKH
Rwandan genocide, in which he states: 
Because the UN and other bodies cannot aid everyone, they must develop rules 
that tell them who they should care about and when they should care. They have 
to be selective Samaritans. Yet, all such rules are supposed to vanish in the face 
of crimes against humanity and genocide, at such instance moral distance should 
be horizonless (: 18-19) 
What Barnett captures here is the clash between our highest moral aspirations and 
the limitations of the concepts and institutions that we build to try and reach the lofty 
DPELWLRQVRIµQHYHUDJDLQ¶,QWKLVUHJDUGWKHYHU\SUHPLVHRIWKH53FRQYHUVLRQSrocess, 
in which the moral threat posed to a common humanity is transformed into collective 
action, needs to be understood in the context of the moral limits of political life itself. As 
)LQQHPRUH   DUJXHV LQWHUYHQWLRQV DUH QRW MXVW ³GLIILFXOW Wechnically or 
ORJLVWLFDOO\´ WKH\ DUH DOVRGLIILFXOW QRUPDWLYHO\ ZKHUHE\ DSSDUHQWQRUPDWLYHSURJUHVV
³GRHVQRWPDNHGLOHPPDVJRDZD\´The R2P has thus been presented as a doctrine 
that appears to present a formula for responding to all cases of mass atrocity around the 
globe in which the only barrier now faced is the reach of our collective humanity.  
However, in practice it is the very belief in the power of humanity to override 
other interests and structures that continues to disappoint and thus undermine the R2P, as 
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belief in a supposedly uncontested moral principle, leads only to dramatically polarising 
results. ,W LVYLWDO WKHQ WR UHIOHFWRQ WKHZD\ WKDW ³XQLYHUVDO HWKLFDO FRQVWUDLQWVDUHQRW
PHUHO\PRUDO´WKH\UHPDLQGHHSO\SROLWLFDODQG³GHSendant on the political will of states 
to ensure their effective implementation´ (Boucher, 2011: 358). Consequently, as Hobson 
UHVSRQGV³WKHUHLVYDOXHLQVHULRXVO\UHIOHFWLQJRQWKHZD\YXOQHUDELOLW\DQG
violence operate in world politics, and coming to grips with our limited capacity to 
XQGHUVWDQG DQG UHVSRQG WR LW´ ,Q WKLV VHQVH E\ UHMHFWLQJ WKH 53 DV D SRWHQWLDO
³H[SUHVVLRQRIKXPDQLW\´1HZPDQDQGHPERGLPHQWRIOLQHDUPRUDOSURJUHVV
one can begin to disentangle the complex nDWXUHRIKXPDQLW\¶VUROHLQXQGHUSLQQLQJWKH
central normative content of the R2P, whilst at the same time recognising the limitations 
RIKXPDQLW\¶VPRWLYDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFHRQWKHSURFHVVRIVWDWHGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ 
Whilst the R2P may have been built on the SUHPLVHRID³FRPPRQUHVSRQVLELOLW\´
WRJHQHUDWH³PRUHFRQFHUWHGHIIRUWV WRSUHYHQWDQGUHVSRQG WRDWURFLW\´ :HOVK
MXVWRYHUWHQ\HDUVDIWHUWKHFRQFHSW¶VDGRSWLRQBan Ki-moon (2016: 8) has been 
IRUFHGWRDGPLWWKDW³DOWKRXJK0HPEHU6WDWHVKDYHUHSHDWHGO\HPSKDVL]HGWKHLUVXSSRUW
for the prevention of atrocity crimes, this has not been sufficiently translated into concrete 
VXSSRUW IRU SUHYHQWLYH VWUDWHJLHV´ :KLOVW ZH FDQ RIWHQ JHW ERJJHG GRZQ Ln smaller 
debates concerning how states interpret specific elements of the UN Charter or the 
ineffectiveness of the current international legal architecture, the ability to address the 
deeper issue of political will has much more to do with the strength of the moral principles 
in which we place so much imperative. Thus, the fact that genocide and crimes against 
KXPDQLW\WULJJHU³RXUPRUDODWWHQWLRQ´DQGDUHVHHQWRRIIHQGRXUVHQVHRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\
(Barrnett, 2002: 19), yet at the same time such beliefs so often fail to translate into 
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effective and timely response, cannot be understood as a failure of political institutions 
alone. Instead it suggests a limit to the moral persuasion of the idea that the feeling of 
moral outrage caused by mass atrocities can fully motivate us to negate other pressing 
PRUDO UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV LQ RUGHU WR UHVSRQG $V 9LN   H[SODLQV ³GHVSLWH WKH
XQLYHUVDODJUHHPHQWWKDWµVRPHWKLQJPXVWEHGRQH¶ZHFRQWLQXHWRDFFHSWH[FXVHVEDVHG
on a pluralist limited understanding of moral responsibility to stand idly by while 
JHQRFLGHXQIROGV´ Subsequently, it leads one to reflect on the limits of the moral concepts 
we place our faith in and the complexities of attempts to realise such goals in the world 
of international politics. 
Conclusion 
For many critics, the R2P is often seen to have failed because it is either too expansive 
and thus too much of a challenge to sovereign integrity, or because it is too minimalist 
and thus reinforces the status quo (Welsh, 2016: 985). However, such analysis of the 
53¶V OLPLWDWLRQV DUJXDEO\ RYHUORRNV WKH ELJJHU SLFWXUH :KDW KDV DOZD\V EHHQ WKH
underlying dilemma facing those trying to generate consensus for protection, is providing 
an answer to the question of why states should respond to mass atrocity crimes? The 
concept of humanity has been central to underpinning the normative and moral responses 
to this question for centuries, yet a belief in the moral righteousness of the concept alone 
does not effortlessly translate into the motivation to enforce protection or prevention 
practices. In light of a recent emphasis on the importance of mobilisation, it is important 
for this article to challenge the key assumptions surrounding this motivational process for 
building consensus for action under the R2P framework.  
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This is significant, as the assumptions made to the motivational qualities of 
humanity do not just impact on abstract theoretical debates, they also work to frame and 
support practical claims in response to mass atrocity crimes. In this sense, if the concept 
of humanity is to remain an essential part of the language used by both diplomats and 
academics in order to support and justify specific decisions, then it is crucial that the 
salience of these claims are sufficiently interrogated. Consequently, what is required 
moving forward is a more reflexive approach to understanding the motivational role of 
humanity, one that takes greater account of how moral claims translate into everyday 
political decision making. 
What this article has therefore brought to attention is a divide between the moral 
aspirations supposedly embedded in the concept of humanity and the extent to which 
humanity can function as a motivational rather than just reflective concept. Through 
rejecting claims that humanity is simply a rhetorical concept of no specific value, along 
ZLWKWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWKXPDQLW\¶VPRWLYDWLRQDOLQIOXHQFHhas fundamentally redefined 
the role of sovereignty in relation to the R2P principle, it has been argued that humanity 
can be best understood as a relatively diminished factor in the motivational process; 
whereby both competing moral and structural factors undermine the apparent higher and 
singular JRDO RI KXPDQLW\¶V SURWHFWLRQ. What this ultimately suggests is a disconnect 
between the moral aspirations and obligations we assume are embedded in the idea of 
humanity and our belief that through constructing concepts that attempt to limit the 
influence of sovereign self-interest, the international community will become more 
effective in their response to averting and responding to mass atrocity crimes. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\LWLVDUJXHGWKDWWKHUHDUHFOHDUOLPLWVWRWKHPRUDOLPSHUDWLYHRIKXPDQLW\¶V
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power that go beyond competing claims of sovereign rights. As a result, the ability to 
address the issue of R2P mobilisation requires us to move beyond the assumed dichotomy 
between sovereignty and humanity and thus re-examine further the central tensions that 
exist in the process of motivating humanitarian action. This article has thus sought to 
reignite critical reflection on the concept of humanity, in order to better inform 
understanding of the complex interaction between politics and morality, and its impact 
on state adherence to the principles of the R2P. 
 
Notes 
 
 
1
 The phrase ³53FRQYHUVLRQSURFHVV´LVXVHGLQUHIHUHQFHWR7KDNXU¶V: 23) emphasis on the R2P 
as a tool of conversion, by which he claims that moral sentiment can be converted into collective action in 
accordance with the R2P framework. 
 
2
 The term ³R2P mobilisation gap´ is used in reference to the claim made by Ban Ki-moon (2016: 7) that 
the R2P is currently suffering from a widening gap ³EHWZHHQ0HPEHU6WDWHV¶FRPPLWPHQWVDQGWKH
reality confronted by vulnerable populations around the world´. 
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